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Umeå universitet
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Huvudmenyn dold.

Fei Xu

Kontakt

E-post
fei.xu@umu.se
Telefon
090-786 51 04

Verksam som

Anknytning
Postdoktor vid Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet Enhet: Nationalekonomi
Plats
Samhällsvetarhuset, Biblioteksgränd 6 Umeå universitet, 901 87 Umeå SE
Optimal income taxation without tax evasion
European Economic Review, Elsevier 2026, Vol. 186
Aronsson, Thomas; Xu, Fei
Contractual requirements and bidding behavior in public procurement with entry
Journal of Public Economic Theory, John Wiley & Sons 2025, Vol. 27, (1)
Drake, Samielle; Xu, Fei
Bribery and the depth of corruption
S-WoPEc (Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics), 1026
Koutsougeras, Leonidas; Santos, Manuel; Xu, Fei
Optimal income taxation without tax evasion
Umeå economic studies, 1020
Aronsson, Thomas; Xu, Fei
Regulation and competition in public procurement
Umeå economic studies, 1013
Drake, Samielle; Xu, Fei
China’s VAT Reform, Enterprises Tax Burden and Innovation
Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics (S-WoPEc), 1008
Feng, Haibo; Liu, Sheng; Xu, Fei
Corruption and adverse selection
Umeå economic studies, 1007
Koutsougeras, Leonidas; Santos, Manuel; Xu, Fei
Corruption, intrinsic motivation, and the love of praise
Journal of Public Economic Theory, John Wiley & Sons 2017, Vol. 19, (6) : 1077-1098
Dhillon, Amrita; Nicolo, Antonio; Xu, Fei
Nash equilibria on soft information control games - based on banking industry in China
International Journal of Financial Research, Sciedu Press 2013, Vol. 4, (1) : 84-92
Xu, Fei; Jiang, Yong
Mathematical model of dynamic games of imperfect agency – based on conspiracy of SMEs and bank managers
Progress in Applied Mathematics, Vol. 4, (1) : 1-8
Jiang, Yong; Xu, Ruijie
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Forskningsprojekt

1 september 2022 till 1 september 2026
Effektivt elutnyttjande och efterfrågeflexibilitet på lokala elnätsmarknader